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Widespread political support has expanded the use of market driven performance 
reforms.  A growing number of these reforms aim to increase democratic accountability 
and enhance performance by including citizens in the evaluation phase of the 
administrative process.  However, citizen support for market themes is unclear.  Do they 
share elected officials enthusiasm or are there limitations on their support?  This research 
assesses these questions by examining the demographics of support for financial sanctions 
and performance pay in education.  The results reveal targeted demographic groups are 
generally less supportive of organizational sanctions and employee incentives than 
untargeted groups.  Targeted parents, including racial minorities, urban, poorly 
educated, and economically disadvantaged parents were the most opposed to market 
reforms designed to enhance of the quality of educational services provided in their 
communities. 
 
 
 
     he mounting support for New Public Management (NPM) principles among 
policymakers has been duly noted (Ho and Ni, 2005; Berman and Wang, 2000; Willoughby, 
2004).  However, literature assessing citizens’ support or lack thereof has not been as 
forthcoming.  Do citizens share elected officials enthusiasm and optimism about NPM 
principles?  Or are there limitations on their support?  If so, are there demographic and 
socioeconomic trends that help explain variations in levels of support for NPM themes 
among citizen groups?  This research undertakes the task of assessing these issues by 
examining the following research questions: 1) is there public support for the use of 
performance incentives and sanctions that link teacher salary and school funding to student 
performance and 2) does this support vary significantly among demographic groups?   
The analysis will allow the study to add to the discussion of Light’s (2006) macro 
and Kelly’s (2005) micro concerns about the usefulness of public sector performance 
management reforms and their ability to adequately appease citizens.  It will also allow for 
an assessment of policymakers’ assumption that target groups such as parents, urban 
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residents and the economically disadvantaged exhibit high levels of support for the use 
performance incentives and sanctions in education.  A lack of support among the 
aforementioned groups could provide evidence that assist in efforts to understand why the 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) student transfers provisions, targeting citizens in 
underperforming school, have been underutilized (Kahlenberg, 2010; Brown et al, 2005).  
Additionally, the research will allow for a determination of whether citizens view the use of 
incentives and sanctions along different continuums.  The perception of positive 
performance incentives through teacher performance pay may elicit a different response 
from negative school sanctions, especially among those with different levels of involvement 
and sophistication (Chingos and Henderson, 2010; Schnieder et al, 1998).   
The demographic variables understudy includes income, neighborhood type, 
parental status, education, party identification, and political ideology.  Several of these 
variables have been included in previous studies (Howell et al, 2007; Chew, 1992; Cooper, 
2005).  This research expands on their efforts by not only conducting a comparative 
analysis of the views of targeted citizen groups but also performing a more specialized 
assessment of parents within each group.  By examining the views of low income, urban, 
and poorly educated parents we can begin to make more accurate determinations about how 
best to appease and engage them.   
The research begins with a brief review of performance reforms in public 
education and the importance of citizens’ views and support.  I then explain the method of 
data collection for the study’s national population sample and continue with a discussion the 
findings.  I conclude with implications for the future of performance and market reforms in 
education. 
 
Underserved Populations and Performance Accountability 
Efforts to promote performance management and include citizens in the administrative 
process are often rooted in the economic principal agent theory.  The theory posits that the 
principal, who is often limited by time and expertise, hires an agent to perform a task on his 
behalf.  The agent is expected to take reasonable care of the principal’s business and 
complete the task in the most efficient and effective manner.   
Theoretically agents that fail to uphold their contractual obligations to the principal 
are subjected to sanctions.  In the private sector, the sanctions often include a loss of 
business due to the customer’s ability to seek the services of similar providers.  In the public 
sector such remedies are often lacking, leaving employees with the ability to exploit the 
principal agent relationship and citizens with inadequate remedy for poor service quality 
(Mosher, 1982).  Several scholars have raised concerns about this exploitation as it relates 
to racially and economically vulnerable members of society.  Stiver’s (2007) posited that 
bureaucrats’ racism and classism influenced the poor quality of services economically 
disadvantaged minority residents received after Hurricane Katrina.  Shelby (2002) noted 
that racial minorities often suffer due to racialized policy and administrative decision 
making that impacts their life chances and opportunities.  Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
(2003) contribute that minorities suffer at the hands of public educators, counselors, and 
other public employees who place citizens into 3 categories: those worthy of extraordinary 
help, those who get what the rules say and no more, and those who get no help (Stiver, 
2007). 
Terry Moe adds to the plausibility that vulnerable citizens suffer at the discretion 
of uninterested or disconnected public agents by providing an example of exploitation in the 
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public school arena.  He argues that the lack of accountability mechanisms in the public 
school system has led to an increased attraction of the wrong type employees.  These 
employees are self-interested, unmotivated, job security conscious, and concerned only with 
maintaining the status quo (Moe, 2003).  It is believed that their prevalence has decreased 
the quality of education and increased citizens’ demands for policies that are cognizant of 
the needed reforms (Hurst et al, 2003; Rudalevige, 2003). 
Recent federal policies have attempted to accommodate this belief by adopting a 
paternalistic approach that significantly limited citizen input in policies fostering a shift 
from policies that promote the use of autonomy and professional accountability as effective 
tools to meet the needs of the citizens to policies that incorporate neoliberal reforms such as 
performance accountability, incentives, and more open citizen inclusion in performance 
evaluation (Little and Bartlett, 2010; Wong, 2008).  The shift to accommodate the reforms 
is best captured in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). 
 
No Child Left Behind 
NCLB sought to improve the quality of education through the use of market principles 
(Tabb, 2002).  Central among these principles are the beliefs that performance 
accountability, competition, and choices for citizens will not only lead to a higher quality of 
services but also appease and empower concerned parents by offering them more control 
(Hurst, 2007).  The legislation began by requiring all 50 states to develop a performance 
system outlining incremental increases in student performance that ultimately would result 
in 100 percent of students demonstrating a proficient understanding of selected subject areas 
by the end of the 2014 school term.  Advancement toward performance goals were to be 
measured and recorded through the public release of student test results.  Teachers in 
schools demonstrating competence, defined as the achievement of legislated performance 
goals, would enjoy job security and public accolades.  Those operating in schools that failed 
to achieve performance goals would potentially encounter sanctions (Fusarelli, 2004; 
McGuinn, 2006). 
 
NCLB Performance Sanctions   
The sanctions were outlined in a five year school improvement plan.  The first year a school 
failed to meet state performance targets, it was to be placed on a watch list and required to 
develop an improvement plan.  The second consecutive year a school failed to meet 
performance goals, the district was required to provide any student attending that school the 
option to attend another school that met performance expectations.  The option to transfer 
was accompanied by a provision which inflicted a financial sanction on the 
underperforming school by requiring the district to pay the cost of transportation.  The third 
year of sanctions expanded on years one and two by also requiring the district to offer 
supplemental educational services to any student qualifying for a free or reduced lunch.  
The supplemental services imposed a second round of financial sanctions on poorly 
performing schools by requiring the district to finance the cost of services that were to be 
provided by an outside entity (Burch, 2007).  Sanctions for years four and five allowed for 
the dismissal of staff, a state takeover, the introduction of private sector control, or a 
conversion to a charter school. 
 
Concerns for Citizen Support for Sanctions & Market Reforms 
The sanctions of years two and three cater to assumptions that citizens believe educators are 
primarily responsible for educational outcome and should be sanctioned in a manner similar 
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to those of unsatisfactory private sector businesses that are forced to better appease 
customers or confront grave financial losses as clients seek the services of their competitors.  
Widespread support for such assumptions could significantly alter the way Americans 
engage in the educational process while simultaneously addressing desires for democratic 
accountability (Mosher, 1982).  However it is unclear if citizens agree with financial 
sanctions that are linked to performance.  Budgetary evidence suggests that many of the 
citizens poised to benefit the most from publically induced finance sanctions have neglected 
to exercise their right to do so.  Less than 7 percent of the estimated $1.8 billion reserved for 
transfers out of poorly performing school and supplemental services have been activated by 
students and parents attending academically vulnerable Title I schools (Kahlenberg, 2010).   
Similarly survey research has failed to demonstrate support for school funding 
sanctions because researchers have largely chosen to forgo its examination and focus on 
other elements of modern performance reforms such as the transfer provision, mandatory 
testing, charter schools, and vouchers.  These accountability provisions are important and 
warrant examination.  However, their successful use is linked to the assertion that citizens 
support the use the financial sanctions for underperforming schools.  If the assumption is 
incorrect, citizens will not use mandatory test results in a manner that compels the school of 
exit to finance the cost of student transfers or supplemental services.  They will also be less 
inclined to support performance provisions that extract funds from academically weak 
public schools to support charter school and voucher programs.  A lack of support for such 
provisions would also raise concern for applications of coproduction theory to current 
education reforms.  Coproduction theory asserts that policymakers and citizens must act as 
equal partners or co producers of education policy reforms (Marschall, 2004; Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993).  Education policies that fail to align with citizens ideas and preferences 
demonstrate a lack of consider for citizens role as co-producers of policy outcomes.  
Citizens may then respond to such policies with inactivity.  When this occurs performance 
provisions that aim to enhance educational outcomes by allowing citizens to sanction 
underperforming schools are unlikely to receive public support and success.  
Given the implications of funding sanction assumptions, this research examines 
citizens’ view on sanctions for poorly performing schools as well as their views of 
performance pay in education.  Adding performance pay to the analysis allows for an 
assessment of views on two essential components of market and performance models, 
incentives and sanctions.  Like funding sanctions, if citizens do not support performance 
pay, its long term use is jeopardized.  Examples of such occurrences are found in the State 
of Oregon’s Department of Transportation where Broom (1995) noted that its employee 
incentive program saved the state millions of dollars.  However the program was 
discontinued when citizens expressed resentment toward the use of financial incentives.  
Assessing views on incentives will also allow for determinations regarding whether citizens 
view rewards and sanctions differently.   If there is substantial support for reward but 
minimal support for sanctions, then future education performance policies may gain more 
traction with citizens by emphasizing rewards, not sanctions.    
Six hypotheses are created to assess varying levels of support for school funding 
sanctions and teacher performance pay among different demographic groups.  The 
hypotheses propose that the individuals from whom support is most needed and desired are 
the least likely to concur.  Their position in society, via interaction with school 
administrators and educators, commitment to their community institutions, and fears of the 
inequalities associated with market tradeoffs render them more leery of market reforms than 
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their more affluent and less involved counterparts.  The six variables included are income, 
education, political ideology, political party, parent status, and residency.  Further analysis 
is undertaken to determine whether uneducated and economically vulnerable parents are 
more or less supportive of provisions targeting their children than their counterparts.   
 
Hypotheses and Measurement 
Hypothesis one proposes parents are less likely to support educational performance reform 
policies than nonparents.  Parents are among the primary targets of education reforms.  
Federal legislation has sought to better inform and engage them by requiring states to 
publically report performance results to parents after which parents are allowed to remove 
their child from underperforming schools with the school of exit financing transfer cost.  
The plausibility of successful provision enforcement is linked to parents’ support for the 
belief that educators are responsible for performance outcomes and should be sanctioned for 
dismal test results.   Bushaw and Lopez’s (2010) documentation of Gallop Poll results 
question this assertion by highlighting parent’s positive perceptions of their education 
system.  Approximately 71 percent of parents had confidence in the men and women 
teaching their children.  Sixty three percent of parents believed schools had a positive 
impact on their oldest child and inspired them to learn, and 76 percent identified parents as 
the key determinant in whether children would learn in school (Bushaw and Lopez, 2010).  
Such perceptions among parents should decrease the likelihood that they will support school 
sanctions and teacher performance pay that is linked to student outcomes.  Parental status is 
measured by asking respondents whether they had school aged children living with them.          
Hypothesis two proposes low income individuals are less likely to support 
educational performance reform policies than those with higher incomes.  Low income 
individuals are likely to attend underfunded and underperforming schools.  Their awareness 
of the challenges of impoverished schools should decrease support for policies that diminish 
the funds of an already financially stressed school and complicate efforts to recruit quality 
teachers.    Low income individuals are also less likely to have accurate information about 
performance policies and how they might positively impact the quality of their child’s 
education (Schneider et al, 1998).  The lack of information can lead to negative evaluations 
of performance reforms.  They are also less likely to have the knowledge, skills, and contact 
to understand and navigate the choice system in education (Apple, 2004; Ball, Bowe, and 
Gewirtz, 1994).  The same arguments can be applied to hypothesis three which states 
individuals with low levels of education are less likely to support performance reform 
policies than those with higher levels of education.  Income was measured by asking “Last 
year what was your total family income before taxes: below $20,000, $20-40,000, $40-
60000, $60-80,000, $80-100,000, or $100,000 and above.”  Education was measured by 
asking “What was the highest grade of school you completed: less than 12th grade, 12th 
grade, some college, college graduate, graduate work.”     
Hypothesis four posits Republicans are more likely to support performance reform 
policies than Democrats.  The Republican Party’s proactive support of market based 
education reforms has been documented in the literature (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Savas, 
1987).  Some examples of those reforms include the use of performance measures, school 
choice programs, vouchers, contracting out school services, and the proliferation and 
expansion of private and charter schools (Patrick, 2007; Gittell and McKenna, 1999; 
Himmelstein, 1990). Democrats have supported performance reforms (Gore, 1993; 
Thompson, 2003) but they tend to gravitate toward voluntary efforts that do not require 
voucher programs and other neoliberal efforts that reduce or remove funding from public 
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schools (Patrick, 2007).  Party identification is measured by asking respondents whether 
they considered themselves to be Democrat, Republican, or some other party affiliate.  This 
analysis limits responses to Democrat and Republican identifiers.   
Hypothesis five posits that liberal ideologues are less likely to support performance 
reform policies than conservatives.  Elliot and MacLennan (1994) noted that conservatives 
argue that the use of market techniques such as options for parents who wish to choose 
among schools of varying levels of performance and quality can serve as a remedy to 
underperforming schools.  Apple (2004) also noted that conservatives support for 
educational reform elements such as competition, markets, choice, performance 
accountability, and national testing have heavily influenced modern day education reforms.  
Furthermore, he adds that conservatives view the traditional school system as one of market 
failure, disappointment and loss (Apple, 2004).  Beliefs systems such as these increase 
conservatives’ support for financial sanctions (Schneider et al, 1997) while liberals tend to 
remain unsupportive of school funding and pay for performance provisions that results in 
decreased funding to underprivileged schools and threaten their ability to attract quality 
educators.  Political ideology was assessed by respondents self-identifying themselves as 
liberal, moderate, or conservative.      
Hypothesis six posits urban residents are less likely to support performance reform 
policies than rural residents.  Stephen (2007) noted that NCLB performance reforms were 
designed to accommodate diverse urban populations.  Unlike rural residents who live in 
sparsely populated areas, urban residents have access to more education service providers.  
However, their frustration with poorly funded inner city schools that cannot attract and 
retain quality teachers should diminish their support for funding sanction (Ainsworth, 
2002).  Residency was measure by asking “Which of the following best describe the place 
where you live: rural area, urban subdivision or suburb, or urban area not a suburb?” 
 
Research Methods and Variables 
Data used in this analysis were taken from a national public opinion survey conducted by 
the Survey Research Laboratory of the Mississippi State University Social Science 
Research Center during the fall of 2008.  The survey was designed to provide a snapshot of 
citizens’ views on education performance reforms as well as other social and economic 
policy areas.  The time point of data collection is of particular importance because of the 
high visibility of the issue and citizens’ ability to actively utilize market techniques in 
education.  Prior to 2008 citizens in some states were unable to utilize the transfer provision 
because state legislation did not provide for its implementation until the 2008 school term.  
The 2008 school term also served as the midpoint of the federal NCLB timeline for states to 
demonstrate that 100 percent of students were proficient in selected subject areas.  
Additionally, the 2008 presidential election year placed education reforms at the forefront 
of the national agenda.  Both candidates highlighted the usefulness of performance and 
market techniques, such as teacher performance pay, as means to enhance educational 
outcomes.  These combined elements heightened awareness of market reforms in education 
and make 2008 an optimal time point to assess citizens’ views on the issue.  
Approximately 1210 adult across the United States were interviewed through a 
computer assisted telephone interviewing system (CATI).  The CATI system is among the 
oldest and most accepted forms of computer assisted interviewing.  It allows the researcher 
to collect large amounts of data in a short amount of time while simultaneously decreasing 
selection bias by utilizing a stratified random digit dialing technique to select households to 
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contact.  Upon initial contact, trained interviewers then further randomize and diversify the 
sample population by asking to speak with the adult who has had the most recent birthday.  
Once this individual is identified and agrees to participate in the study, the computer will 
prompt the interviewer to read a series of multiple choice questions from the computer 
monitor and enter the appropriate responses.  The multiple choice format allows the 
interviewer to point and click on the right answer.  The answer is then converted into a code 
by the CATI system and uploaded into a database.          
All calls were made between the hours of 5 pm and 9 pm during the week, from 10 
am to 6 pm on Saturday, and 1 pm to 9 pm on Sunday.  The overall response rate was 
54.9% and the sample error was 3.5% thereby indicating that if every adult US resident was 
interviewed the results could differ up to 3.5% from the reported results.  In an effort to 
address bias and present a representative sample, characteristics of the survey respondents 
were compared to 2007 U.S. Census Bureau data.  A weighting scheme was created and 
applied to adjust the data by selected demographic characteristics including age, race, 
gender, and education (Holmes and Goodman, 2010).     
 
Dependent Variables 
Citizen’s support for consequential performance policies, the dependent variable, was 
measured by responses to two questions.  The first variable, support for the organizational 
sanction provision, was measured by asking respondents:  “It is alright for a school that is 
not meeting academic standards to lose money.”  This statement allows for the assessment 
of citizens’ views of school funding sanctions such as those identified by the NCLB citizen 
induced sanctioning provision.   The provision seeks to remove funds from 
underperforming schools by allowing students to transfer out of schools that consecutively 
fail to meet performance goals and attend a higher performing school with the failing school 
covering student transportation expenses.  The second dependent variable, teacher 
performance pay, was measured by asking respondents:  “Public school teachers’ salaries 
should be based on student performance.”   This variable assesses support for Race to the 
Top and other performance policy provisions that seek to link student performance to 
teachers’ financial compensation.  Respondents could strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree, or neither agree or disagree with each statement.  Those who strongly 
agreed were code with the number one.  Those who agreed were codes as two.  Those who 
neither agreed nor disagreed were coded with the number three.  While those who disagreed 
were coded as four and those who strongly disagreed was coded as five.  Higher values of 
the dependent variable indicate less support for the performance reforms under study.  A 
means analysis is performed to assess variations in citizens’ views.  The means analysis 
allows for a bivariate comparison of citizens’ views in each demographic group.    
Additional analysis is performed by conducting a multivariate assessment of the 
elements influencing school sanction and teacher performance pay attitudes.  The 
assessment allows the research to determine whether sanctions and pay incentives are 
viewed along a different continuum.  It also explores whether the impact of important 
variables such as parental status, race, and economic class are mediated by other variables.  
 
Findings 
Table 1 includes the assessment of school sanction and teacher performance pay views.  Its 
higher school sanctions values for parents, urban, low income, liberal, and Democrat 
respondents reveals support for the research hypotheses that these individuals are less 
supportive of performance sanctions in education than their counterparts in the general 
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population.  Notable among the bivariate assessments is the wide margin of difference 
between the mean level of school sanctioning support for liberals (3.43) and conservatives 
(2.89) in the general population.  Liberals were much less supportive of sanctioning schools 
that fail to meet performance expectations.  The finding aligns with those of previous 
studies and is important to this analysis because ideological views are largely informed by 
one’s life experiences, i.e. position in society.  Social class, family practices and upbringing, 
exposure to discriminatory treatment, quality of education received, access to education 
advancement and economic opportunities, and a host of other variables influencing life 
chances all culminate in one’s ideological perspective and often result in several vulnerable 
groups that have experienced limited opportunities and discriminatory practices to adopt 
liberal philosophies.  These individuals, who are particularly targeted by policy reforms, 
exhibited a lack of support of for policy assertions that sanctioning poorly performing 
schools may invoke the desired change in outcomes.  Their lack of support for school 
funding sanction highlight the need to more meaningfully consider coproduction theory’s 
call for increased venues and measures to allow a larger variety of targeted citizens to 
function as active coproducers or partners in the creation of public policies.  Without such 
considerations, policies like the NCLB transfer provisions are likely to remain unsuccessful 
because they do not capture the sentiment of targeted citizens.  A point that is further 
supported by the assessment of parents, minorities, and urban residents views.     
Parents (3.28) were less supportive of performance funding sanctions for poorly 
performing schools than nonparents (3.07, p<.01).  Lower levels of support among parents 
is consistent with the belief that parents’ knowledge of the school funding debate decreases 
the likelihood that they will support efforts that link funding to performance (Bushaw and 
Lopez, 2010; Buckley and Schneider, 2003).  The finding also aligns with Brown’s (2005) 
notation that parents in the states of Mississippi, Connecticut, Utah, Maryland, and Virginia 
exercised caution in their request to utilize the transfer provision.  Less than 3 percent of 
transfer eligible student in these states requested and followed through with a transfer under 
NCLB (Brown et al, 2005).  Though lack of options may partially explain the dismal 
transfer numbers in some districts it may not be the only variable accounting for the 
underutilization of the transfer provision.  Clearly parents’ lack of support for financial 
sanctions may be a determining factor.   
Urban residents were also significantly less supportive of school funding sanctions 
than rural residents, average score of 2.62 to 2.30 (p<.01).  Lower levels of support among 
these individuals are explained by Payne (2008) who posits that unlike federal policymakers 
who have a limited view of the issues in urban communities, urban residents’ experiences 
with cultural, social, and economic issues that plague their schools provides them with a 
multidimensional view of educational problems that financial sanctions and transfers are not 
equip to address (Ainsworth, 2002).  Utilizing these techniques might only serve to further 
damage struggling urban schools (Stephen, 2007).  Urban residents limited support further 
demonstrate the need to more meaningfully engage citizens in policy development as 
advocated by proponents of coproduction theory.  The residential differences in opinion 
might also be linked to ideological differences of rural and urban residents.  School funding 
sanctions, vouchers, and other financial reforms are often promoted and supported by 
conservative ideologues.  Rural residents have historically been more conservative while 
urban residents have largely identified with liberal ideologues.     
Democrats were also notably more opposed than Republicans.  Lower levels of 
support among Democrats support the study’s hypotheses and align with the last three 
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decades of federal education legislation under Presidents George HW Bush, Bill Clinton, 
and George W Bush.  The Republican Presidential Administrations of both George H.W. 
Bush and George W. Bush introduced legislation that promoted market reforms and 
competition.  The Clinton Administration pushed for the development of uniform 
performance standards and evidence of outcomes (Hurst et al., 2003; Rudalevige, 2003; 
Ziebarth, 2001).   
 
Table 1. Demographic Variables and Support for Performance Policies 
Ideology 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for  
Teacher Pay for Policies 
Conservative 2.89 3.04 
Moderate 3.21 3.18 
Liberal 3.43 3.37 
N Size 1145 1148 
Significance p=.000 p=.001 
   
Party Identification 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for Policies 
Republican 2.91 3.19 
Independent 3.15 3.15 
Democrat 3.28 3.16 
N Size 1160 1162 
Significance p=.000 p=.884 
   
Education 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for Policies 
High School Dropout 3.07 2.95 
High School Graduate 3.15 3.00 
Some College 3.15 3.39 
College Grade or Higher 3.18 3.35 
N Size 1206 1208 
Significance p=.874 p=.000 
   
Race 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for Teacher Pay for 
Policies 
White 3.09 3.15 
Minority 3.43 3.29 
N Size 1206 1208 
Significance p=.000 p=.146 
  
Income 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for Teacher Pay for 
Policies 
Under $20,000 3.22 2.66 
$20-40,000 3.26 3.29 
$40-60,000 3.05 3.22 
$60-80,000 3.30 3.29 
$80,000+ 3.11 3.27 
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N Size 885 887 
Significance p=.286 p=.000 
   
Parent 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for  
Teacher Pay for Policies 
No 3.07 3.08 
Yes 3.28 3.33 
N Size 1205 1207 
Significance p=.004 p=.001 
  
Residency 
Support for 
Organization Sanctions 
Support for  
Teacher Pay for Policies 
Rural 3.07 3.15 
Suburb 3.07 3.20 
Urban 3.34 3.13 
N Size 1189 1193 
Significance p=.005 p=.685 
 
The bivariate assessment of teacher performance pay views offer support for the 
parental and ideological hypotheses.  Parents (3.33) were less supportive of linking 
teachers’ salaries to student outcomes than nonparents (3.08).  Liberals (3.37) were also less 
supportive than conservatives (3.04).  Similar to the discussion of funding sanctioning 
attitudes, liberals’ ideological stance and modest support for the use of competitive 
measures in education reform may be driven by their awareness of and sensitivity to the 
negative drawbacks to vulnerable schools who seek to recruit top candidates.  Policies 
linking salaries to student performance in historically poorly performing school districts 
may further diminish recruitment efforts.  Likewise parents are more informed about the 
challenges educators encounter.  Their increases in knowledge leads to respect and 
admiration for educator which in turn leads to opposition to policy reforms that carry 
implications for teachers’ salaries based on student outcomes (Bushaw and Lopez, 2010).   
Both education and income failed to yield findings in the hypothesized direction.  
High school drop outs (2.95) were more supportive of teacher performance pay than college 
graduates (3.35).  Likewise, individuals with the least amount of income were more 
supportive of teacher performance pay than those with higher annual incomes.  The finding 
indicates that although vulnerable citizens may be unwilling to financially sanction schools 
they are supportive of holding educators accountable by linking their salary to student 
outcomes.  This aligns with Cooper’s (2005) assessment of the views of low income 
African American mothers and guardians.   She found these individuals held high levels of 
distrust and frustration with their child’s public school teacher.  Their frustration caused 
them to value the use of performance mechanisms and to also seek the services of 
alternative service providers in the private and charter and school arenas.   
Cooper (2005) neglected to assess the views of parents of greater means and 
education.  This study’s assessment of these parents’ views reveals several important 
findings.  Parents with the least amount of education (3.98) were the most opposed to 
teacher performance pay of all demographic groups.  The contrast in findings between 
parents with limited education and their counterparts in the general population (nonparent 
mean value of 2.66) highlight the importance of a multivariate assessment of attitudes of 
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two important variables, education and parental status.  The failure to evaluate these 
attitudes could misinform policymakers by giving them the impression the poorly educated 
parents support performance pay models in education.  College educated parents were 
slightly more supportive of teacher performance pay when compared to parents who did not 
complete high school.  However it should be noted that they were more opposed than 
college educated nonparents and high school dropout nonparents.  
 
Table 2. Parental Controls 
 Nonparent Parents Only 
Ideology Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for 
Performance 
Policies 
Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay 
for Policies 
Conservative 2.81 2.96 3.03 3.19 
Liberal 3.34 3.18 3.60 3.73 
Moderate 3.14 3.16 3.35 3.21 
N size 733 734 411 413 
Significance p=.000 p=.057 p=.001 p=.000 
     
 Nonparent Parents Only 
Party 
Identification 
Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for 
Performance 
Policies 
Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay 
for Policies 
Republican 2.73 3.06 3.18 3.40 
Democrat 3.18 3.07 3.47 3.33 
Independent 3.15 3.10 3.16 3.25 
N size 743 744 416 416 
Significance p=.000 p=.939 p=.069 p=.642 
     
 Nonparent Parents Only 
Education Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for 
Performance 
Policies 
Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay 
for Policies 
High School 
Dropout 
2.96 2.66 3.48 3.98 
High School 
Graduate 
3.11 2.93 3.21 3.13 
Some College 3.08 3.36 3.29 3.43 
College Grade or 
Higher 
3.08 3.33 3.34 3.39 
N size 779 780 411 426 
Significance p=.691 p=.000 p=.675 p=.004 
     
 Nonparent Parents Only 
Race Support for Support for Support for Support for 
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Organization 
Sanctions 
Teacher Pay for 
Performance 
Policies 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Teacher Pay 
for Policies 
White 3.06 3.05 3.16 3.34 
Minority 3.14 3.30 3.77 3.26 
N size 779 780 426 427 
Significance p=.527 p=.040 p=.000 p=.594 
     
 Nonparent Parents Only 
Income Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for 
Performance 
Policies 
Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay 
for Policies 
Under $20,000 3.10 2.51 3.44 2.95 
$20-40,000 3.16 3.27 3.49 3.33 
$40-60,000 2.99 3.17 3.17 3.34 
$60-80,000 3.30 3.41 3.30 3.18 
$80,000+ 3.03 3.29 3.19 3.24 
N Size 537 538 346 348 
Significance p=.476 p=.000 p=.472 p=.404 
     
 Nonparent Parents Only 
Location Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay for 
Performance 
Policies 
Support for 
Organization 
Sanctions 
Support for 
Teacher Pay 
for Policies 
Rural 2.99 3.02 3.21 3.35 
Suburb 3.07 3.20 3.09 3.21 
Urban 3.19 3.02 3.65 3.39 
N Size 772 774 416 416 
Significance p=.151 p=.111 p=.003 p=.506 
 
Table 2 highlights the views of parents and nonparents.  The results yield 
important findings that were not readily apparent in the initial analysis.  For example, Table 
1 indicates that high school dropouts were more supportive of school sanctions than college 
graduates, thus failing to offer support for the research hypothesis.  After isolating the views 
of parents significant differences were reveal.  The hypothesis was upheld.  The mean value 
for parents who did not complete high school was 3.48, a sizable decrease in support from 
the means of 2.96 for high school dropout nonparents and 3.34 for college graduate parents.  
Clearly those most likely to be unable to academically assist their children do not support 
funding sanctions for poorly performing schools therefore efforts to meet their needs by 
allowing them to financially sanction schools may be insufficient. 
Sizable differences in the mean levels of support of urban and rural parents and         
nonparents were also revealed.  Initially rural residents (3.07) were notably more supportive 
of school funding sanctions compared to urban residents (3.34), lower mean values indicate 
more support.  After controlling for parental status, rural residents were still more 
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supportive than urban residents.  However, the level of rural resident support decreased 
from 3.07 (all) to 3.21 (parents).  The level of support for urban residents decreased from 
3.34 (all) to 3.65 (parents).  Like the findings for those with the least amount of education, 
the low levels of support among urban and rural parents raise doubt about efforts to 
successfully reform schools by sanctioning poor performers.   
A more holistic comparison of school sanction and teacher performance pay views 
failed to yield consistent findings.  Some groups were more supportive of school sanctions 
while others were more supportive of teacher performance pay.  For example, rural (3.21 to 
3.35) and suburban parents (3.09 to 3.21) showed higher levels of support for school 
sanctions than teacher performance pay.  Urban parents were more favorable of teacher 
performance pay policies than sanctions (3.39 to 3.65).  Inconsistencies were found among 
parents with the least and highest amounts of education.  Both groups were more supportive 
of school sanctions than teacher performance pay.  Parents’ ideological philosophy 
produced concurrent findings.  Liberals and conservatives were both more supportive of 
school funding sanctions than teacher performance pay.  Lower levels of support could 
produce problems for districts that require tax increases to finance performance pay 
schemes.  The variations in findings require additional multivariate analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
 The support of elected officials, administrators, and citizens is pivotal to the 
successful survival of market centered administrative reforms.  While researchers have 
made stride in assessing support among policymakers and administrator, documentation of 
citizen support is somewhat scant.  This research adds to the literature by assessing citizen 
support for two neoliberal market themes found in education legislation, organization 
sanctions and employee pay for performance.  The findings reveal that support among 
targeted demographic groups failed to show promise for reforms at the grassroots level.  
Parents, low income, poorly educated, and urban respondents exhibited low levels of 
support.  A lack of support among these groups is detrimental to reform success.  It may 
help explain why less than 5 percent of eligible parents and students have requested a 
transfer out of schools that fail to meet performance expectations (Brown, 2005). 
The potential for additional information explaining the underutilization of 
performance policies in education is further revealed in the dismal support found among the 
parents of targeted student groups.  These individuals demonstrated the lowest levels of 
support of all demographic groups.  Their lack of support indicates that current trends in 
education performance reforms may be ineffective in their approaches to enhance 
educational outcomes in a manner that engages vulnerable citizens and builds public trust.  
More effective policies might be developed by actively considering how position in society 
may impact the level of support targeted citizens harbor for neoliberal policy reforms.  The 
life experiences, access to information, and personal interactions of parents, urban residents, 
the economically disadvantaged, and liberals can cause them to view market reforms 
unfavorably.  Policies that are cognizant of how their life experiences and chances color 
their views are more likely to gain favor and success.   
While this study’s finding contribute to our understanding of citizens’ views of 
performance management legislation it is important to acknowledge its limitation.  First, the 
data was collected in 2008.  Citizens’ perceptions of performance reforms may have 
remained constant or shifted over time.  Research incorporating more recent data is needed 
to assess this issue.  Second, although income and education may serve as a proxy for race 
in this analysis, race is not included as a variable.  Assessing views along racial lines will 
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only strengthen our understanding of the issue.  Lastly, it is important to note this study is 
descriptive in nature.  It primarily aimed to replace assumptions about citizens’ support or 
opposition for financial sanctions and performance pay in education with evidence from a 
national study.  It was occupied with who and what, not why.  The need for research 
examining the “why” in citizens’ performance policy perceptions and preferences is duly 
noted.   
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